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Abstract 
Theory suggests that relations between authorities affect implementation. This 
article studies the link between central and local government agencies in the 
Swedish labour market sector. The analysis is based on new quantitative data. 
The results indicate that central and local government agencies have very 
different priorities, but they nonetheless cooperate to a considerable extent. 
However, cooperation and ‘good’ implementation only coincide under certain 
conditions. If the collaborative endeavours are explicitly designed to lead to 
implementation of a specific and demanding task, cooperation is positively 
related to implementation performance. Agencies that collaborate to a consider-
able extent at a general level do not, however, perform better than others. Thus, 
I argue that theories should be developed and tested to indicate when co-
operation between public authorities will promote implementation, instead of 
assuming that cooperation, in general, is a ‘good thing’. 
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1 Introduction 
Many of the challenges facing modern societies – such as environmental 
protection, fighting poverty or reducing unemployment – are very difficult to 
manage within a single public authority. The virtues of interorganizational co-
operation have therefore been emphasised in the implementation research 
literature. Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1984) pioneering study of how a labour 
market programme was carried out in Oakland in the 1960s is often considered 
to provide a starting point. 
Some scholars claim that cooperation between authorities is inherently good 
(e g Hudson et al 1999; Jones et al 2004). Furthermore, we learn from game 
theory that cooperation will usually lead to the best mutual solutions for actors 
involved (Ostrom 1990). The joint best solution for local agents is, however, 
not necessarily the same thing as central government intentions. Close co-
operation between local actors might in fact lead to a higher priority for local 
goals – perhaps even at the expense of what the central government would like 
to attain. Time and other resources also have to be devoted to establishing and 
maintaining collaboration. This can in turn make implementation more 
difficult, ceteris paribus. The consequences of cooperation should therefore be 
examined empirically, rather than assumed. 
This article studies how interorganizational cooperation influences 
implementation. The focus is on the relationship between Public Employment 
Service (PES) offices and municipalities at local level in Swedish active labour 
market policy. The PES offices – as central government agencies – are the 
main local labour market actors, but in recent years municipalities have become 
an increasingly important factor. 
Three empirical questions are to be answered. The main question is whether 
the level of cooperation is linked to implementation performance: Does co-
operation improve implementation? Prior to answering this question it is 
necessary to portray the relationship between the authorities concerned. Thus, I 
examine two issues related to the main question. Firstly, I investigate the ac-
tors’ objectives. Is there some kind of tension between them that makes their 
relationship an empirically interesting topic for research? Secondly, I describe 
collaborative patterns. To what extent do the agencies in fact cooperate and is 
there variation in the level of cooperation? 
There is a shortage of statistical evidence in the European implementation 
literature (Winter 2003b). Hence, this article employs a quantitative approach.  
IFAU – Does cooperation improve implementation?  4 
The analysis is based on recent data consisting of information from several 
sources, for example a questionnaire addressed to chief managers of the PES 
offices, and administrative data recorded by the Swedish National Labour 
Market Administration. By using large-N data, this article makes an important 
contribution to the ‘case-study’-dominated European implementation literature. 
The results indicate that municipalities’ objectives are more locally focused 
than those of PES offices’. As a result, increased municipal involvement will 
probably imply more emphasis on local aims rather than central government 
objectives. Although the authorities have different agendas, they collaborate to 
a considerable extent. In this respect, the central government’s ambition is 
realised. Moreover, the empirical evidence reveals that cooperation will not 
automatically improve implementation. Only when the authorities have a co-
operation contract explicitly designed to carry out a specific task, in an area in 
which the PES office’s obligation is especially demanding, there is a clear 
positive relationship between cooperation and implementation. Note that co-
operation can be valuable for other reasons than those investigated here. But 
the results indicate that we should not assume that cooperative activities 
between central and local government agencies always have a positive impact 
on implementation. 
The article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical discourse is out-
lined. An introduction of the empirical case comes next, followed by a section 
that discusses data and methodological issues. Then, empirical results are 
reported in three sections. Finally, I conclude by summing up the results and by 
discussing their possible implications. 
 
 
2  Collaborative efforts and 
implementation theory 
The public administration’s local practices are not always the same as the 
intentions stated in official documents endorsed by politicians at the central 
level. In addition, performance frequently varies from one local context to 
another. As a result, it is wise not to assume that the study of statutes, govern-
ment bills and regulations is enough to understand what political decisions 
imply ‘in the real world’. This story is convincingly documented in the imp-
lementation research literature (for an overview see Winter 2003b).  
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An implementation problem occurs when a political decision is not carried 
out in accordance with what the decision-maker wants. Thus, we assume that 
local practice should be in line with the elected officials’ intentions, i e agents 
should follow the principal’s instructions. This perspective is rather easy to 
endorse, based on normative democratic theory. In a modern democracy, 
citizens freely elect representatives who can be held to account at the ballot 
box. Politicians cannot implement a policy all by themselves; they have to rely 
on a civil service to do this. However, the citizens cannot replace the bureau-
cracy by casting their vote. Consequently, a prerequisite for satisfactory demo-
cracy is that politicians control and govern a civil service that respects their 
decisions (Sannerstedt 2001). The rule of law is another aspect that should be 
taken into account. In a liberal democracy we normally consider it desirable 
that similar cases are treated in a similar manner. Variation in the manner in 
which rules are applied is therefore obvious signal of unequal treatment (Keiser 
& Soss 1998). 
There are also arguments in favour of another point of view, which argues 
that the local civil service is more receptive to local desires and needs. Dis-
crepancies between a decision and its implementation might therefore in 
practice mean a ‘better’ policy and a greater responsiveness to citizens’ wishes. 
Depending on which normative starting-point is assumed, variation in, or in-
sufficient, implementation performance is thus not always necessarily a dis-
advantage (deLeon 1999). But, nonetheless, most scholars would concur that 
there is a problem if there is a gap between the law and practice (Keiser & Soss 
1998). This paper uses a top-down approach to the question of implementation. 
If central government is intended to be the principal, with a popular mandate to 
make decisions in a certain policy area, deviation from the government’s 
decisions is considered to be a problem of governance. 
Some political decisions are quite easy to carry out and can be managed al-
most exclusively by a unitary public administration. A change in a tax rate or 
the level of a general welfare benefit is virtually self-implemented. But imp-
lementation is normally more complicated and involves several participants, 
who may be public or private. They may also be at different levels of govern-
ment or in different policy areas. After reviewing the literature on inter-
organizational settings in the implementation phase, O’Toole (2003, p  237) 
concludes:  
IFAU – Does cooperation improve implementation?  6 
It seems clear, therefore, that the topic of interorganizational relations will remain 
important for administrators tasked with helping to make policy implementation 
succeed. Accordingly, it is critical to understand how to make sense of such 
institutional settings for improving prospects for implementation success. 
Hence, an important component in almost every contemporary framework exp-
laining implementation success and failure has to do with interorganizational 
relationships (Bardach 1998; Goggin et al 1990; Hjern & Porter 1981; O’Toole 
& Montjoy 1984; O’Toole et al 1997; O’Toole 2003; Pressman & Wildavsky 
1984; Winter 2003a). 
Modern political systems comprise many levels of government.
1 This 
implies “that multiple levels of government are involved simultaneously in pro-
grams and policies and that a single level of government rarely has single 
power and influence over the way that programs are designed, funded, man-
aged and delivered” (Radin 2003, p 608). When a central government agency 
carries out a political decision at local level, the policy or programme is put 
into practice in a context in which municipal administrations operate. Imp-
lementation often implies some sort of contact between the central government 
authority and the municipalities. In such cases, tensions could arise, since local 
authorities are based on separate geographical entities with dissimilar priorities. 
Intricate issues may arise: What goals should receive priority? What are the 
appropriate actions? Which level is responsible for what? Who should pay? 
This makes it interesting to find out more about how the level of cooperation 
between authorities from different levels of government affects imp-
lementation. 
Before proceeding further, I must define what I mean by cooperation. There 
is some confusion about how cooperation should be defined and how it is 
related to concepts like collaboration, conflict, communication and co-
ordination (Alexander 1995; Alter 1990). In this article, cooperation and 
collaboration is synonymously defined as all interactions among organizations 
aiming at solving public problems in some way or another. Thus, cooperation is 
                                                      
1 There is more than one level of government in almost every state, such as the central, regional 
and local levels. This paper focuses on central-local government relationships, but from a 
theoretical point of view the topic could be expanded to apply to links between authorities at any 
level of government. This includes the supranational level, such as the European Union.  
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a set of activities. At a minimum, cooperation implies information exchange, 
but it can also, for example, involve joint projects or joint decision making. 
There are theoretical arguments asserting that the degree of cooperation bet-
ween central government authorities and municipalities should have a positive 
impact on implementation. All else equal, one would expect a public ad-
ministration with access to considerable resources – for example in the form of 
money, staff, expertise and information – to carry out a policy or programme 
better than an administration which lacks resources; see e  g Keiser & Soss 
(1998) and Meier & McFarlane (1996). A local office of a central government 
authority that cooperates with a municipality may enhance its own capacity. 
For instance, municipalities might contribute information about local con-
ditions and political development plans, and they could have staff, expertise, 
financial resources and premises that the central government’s local office 
lacks. By cooperating, the authorities’ activities can be coordinated and there-
fore they can avoid contradictory activities. 
However, there is a tendency in the implementation literature to neglect 
possible negative aspects of collaboration. According to some authors co-
operation is something good per se. Hudson et al (1999, p 238) write that, 
“while recognizing that there are other positions, this article takes the 
normative position that collaboration is generally a ‘good thing’ – a stance 
which is consistent with the rather long history of collaboration in organization 
theory and public administration.” In many ways this might be true, but some 
caveats must be reported. First, when an office of a central government 
authority collaborates with a municipality it is possible that other goals than 
those of the central government are of primary importance. Local cooperation 
could imply that the principal’s objectives are put on one side when the agents 
concerned are trying to reach their best joint solution. In other words, instead of 
pursuing central government directives, local actors may be working for local 
goals. This is a problem, especially if the policy area is intended to be a central 
government responsibility, since central government is accountable for the 
decisions arrived at. Secondly, cooperation may be a complicated process in-
volving bargaining, and therefore calling for considerable time and other re-
sources on the part of the agents concerned. If the authorities are obliged to  
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work together and agree on decisions it could even paralyse implementation. 
And perhaps the costs of cooperating might well outweigh the revenues?
2 
Cooperation can, of course, have important implications for other aspects of 
the welfare state. A public programme might, for example, become more 
effective if central and local government authorities cooperate, even if imp-
lementation is not enhanced.
3 Cooperation might also imply that a decision 
becomes more legitimate in the eyes of the target group for a certain policy. 
However, this study is confined to the question of implementation. 
Central government authorities and municipalities, or for that matter 
organizations in general, can collaborate in different ways. In this article, a 
distinction between three sorts of cooperation is employed. Communication im-
plies that the organizations communicate and exchange information. This does 
not mean that they join together and work as a team. Instead, they are clearly 
separate actors. An office of a central government authority can try to improve 
its access to information, and hence its capacity, by communicating with the 
municipality, for example in the form of meetings, phone calls and e-mails. 
Contracting is another way of cooperating. This means that an office of a cen-
tral government authority makes some kind of agreement, perhaps in the form 
of a formal contract, with the municipality. As a result of this arrangement, the 
municipality acts on the behalf of the central government agency. But the 
organizations are still not operating as a team. The office of the central govern-
ment authority seeks to improve performance by letting the municipality be 
responsible for certain distinct parts of the implementation. Integration, on the 
other hand, means that the authorities act jointly. For instance, they can arrange 
joint programmes, set up task groups and locate personnel in the same prem-
ises. The main feature is that they do things together. 
                                                      
2 In an overview article on cooperation (not specifically about implementation issues) 
Smith et al (1994, p 17) note that research usually has a positive attitude towards cooperative 
activities, although cooperation in some cases can have harmful consequences. The authors 
underscore that “additional research is needed on the potential drawbacks of cooperation and the 
conditions under which a very high degree of cooperation is not desirable.” 
3 Even if a decision is carried out perfectly in line with the politicians’ intentions, that does not 
entitle one to say that the policy is effective. The decision itself could be based on a causal theory 
that is accurate or not, i e it is not certain that desired outcomes are achieved by the formula the 
statute or regulation suggests. This article focuses exclusively on the question of how elected 
representatives can control the civil service to ensure that their decisions are implemented. In 
other words, the dependent variable is output, not outcome.  
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These three ways of cooperating – communication, contracting and 
integration – fit the definition of cooperation employed in this article (i e all 
interactions between authorities with the purpose of solving public problems). 
But, nonetheless, they are still distinct ways of collaboration. Thus, it is 
possible to specify three more specific questions to be investigated empirically: 
Does the level of communication between authorities affect implementation? 
Does a cooperation contract between authorities affect implementation? Does 
the degree of integration between authorities affect implementation? 
 
 
3  The Swedish labour market case 
High unemployment is a major problem in most OECD countries and the 
unemployment rate has, on average, doubled since 1973 (Martin & Grubb 
2001). A government can use active labour market policies to reduce the 
number of persons without a job, i e “measures to raise employment that are 
directly targeted at the unemployed” (Calmfors et al 2002, p 5). This includes 
job broking activities and labour market programmes such as labour market 
training and subsidised employment. In Sweden, the National Labour Market 
Administration (Arbetsmarknadsverket) implements the policy and PES offices 
(Arbetsförmedlingar) carry out decisions at the local level. There is a PES in 
nearly all municipalities, and in larger cities there is more than one office. 
One feature in recent years is increased involvement of the municipalities in 
implementation, although the overall responsibility is still retained at the cent-
ral level, with the PES as the main local actor (Lundin & Skedinger 2001; 
Salonen & Ulmestig 2004). Various issues closely connected with labour 
market policy are a municipal responsibility in Sweden. For instance, 
municipalities are large employers – representing about 20 per cent of all em-
ployment. They are also responsible for local development. And finally, they 
provide inhabitants with a social safety net by paying welfare benefits to those 
in need. Municipalities have, perhaps because of the close connection between 
their traditional responsibilities and labour market issues, become involved in 
the implementation stage of the labour market policy. For instance, it is 
estimated that in 1999 around 80,000 persons were engaged in labour market 
programmes organized by the municipalities (but at least partly financed by 
central government). This accounts for about 40 per cent of the participants in 
all the National Labour Market Administration’s active measures (Lundin &  
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Skedinger 2001). In addition, municipalities arrange activities for persons who 
are not ‘job ready’ and who are living on welfare benefits – approximately 
12,000 persons were activated in such measures at any given point in time in 
2002 (Salonen & Ulmestig 2004). A majority of municipalities have special 
labour market administrations, while others incorporate these issues in their 
social services administration, for example.
4 
The trend towards increased municipal involvement is not solely a Swedish 
phenomenon. Municipalities have started to play a more active role in recent 
years in many European countries – for example in Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands (Larsen et al 2001). Moreover, the European Union has encourag-
ed member countries to increase municipal participation in order to enhance 
policy efficiency (Commission of the European Communities 2001). 
Two aspects of active labour market policy in Sweden are studied in this 
article: (i) actions to prevent long-term unemployment among young people, 
and (ii) a programme called the Activity Guarantee. In both areas, the central 
government encourages collaboration between the PES offices and the 
municipalities. 
 
3.1 The  youth  policy 
In 1994, the government declared that no young person should remain openly 
unemployed for more than 100 days. The government regarded long-term 
unemployment as devastating for future labour market prospects. Young people 
are defined as long-term unemployed if they are openly unemployed for more 
than 100 days. Thus, the ambition is that every individual of less than 25 years 
of age should be offered a labour market programme if they are unable to find a 
job within three months of registration at the PES. The central government has 
encouraged the municipalities to take part in actions to reduce long-term un-
employment among young people in different ways. For instance, in 1995 the 
government introduced the Municipal Youth Programme (Kommunala ung-
domsprogrammet) and three years later the UVG-guarantee (Ungdoms-
garantin). The PES are expected to collaborate with the municipalities in both 
programmes (Carling & Larsson 2002). 
                                                      
4 There was an increase in the number of municipal labour market administrations in the 1990s, 
indicating an increased municipal involvement in Swedish labour market policy. Seven out of ten 
municipalities had a special department for labour market issues in 1998, compared to two out of 
10 in 1995 (Swedish Association of Local Authorities 1999).  
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3.2  The Activity Guarantee 
In August 2000, the Swedish government launched a new labour market 
programme called the Activity Guarantee (Aktivitetsgarantin). The target group 
was individuals who had been unemployed for a considerable period. By means 
of intense job-search assistance and close monitoring, persons who were, or 
who risked being, registered with the PES as long-term unemployed were to be 
given a place in the programme. Long-term registration involves a period of 
registration with the PES of at least two years without having a job. The central 
government ambition is that unemployed individuals should be enrolled in the 
programme after 27 months of unbroken PES registration, at the latest 
(Forslund et al 2004). 
The Activity Guarantee is a programme within which includes all the or-
dinary labour market programmes, such as labour market training and sub-
sidised employment. What distinguishes the Activity Guarantee from other 
labour market programmes is a very intense treatment. All activities within the 
Activity Guarantee are assumed to be full-time activities and the participants 
should meet their personal PES supervisor on a regular basis, and more 
frequently than before they entered the Activity Guarantee programme 
(Forslund et al 2004). 
Since the persons participating in the guarantee are ‘hard cases’ and often 
have multiple problems, the government encourages PES offices to collaborate 
with other local actors (e g municipalities). According to Forslund et al (2004), 
the municipalities are, in practice, the PES offices’ most common cooperation 
partners. 
There are distinct dissimilarities between the youth policy and the Activity 
Guarantee. The youth clients have not been unemployed for such a long time 
and they are probably more motivated than the participants in the Activity 
Guarantee. The Activity Guarantee is also a much more demanding assignment 
for PES offices, since it is more intense. 
 
 
4  Research design and data 
Whereas quantitative approaches have become increasingly common and more 
sophisticated in US literature, studies based on large-N data in the European 
context are rare. There are at least two problems in this context. Firstly, it is 
difficult to generalise the findings when only studying one or a couple of cases.  
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Secondly, it is extremely difficult to control for a large number of potential 
explanations in case studies; it is almost inevitably to wind up in a situation in 
which several variables account for the variation in the dependent variable 
equally well. Goggin (1986) pointed this out several years ago and Winter 
(2003b) continues to accentuate the importance of statistical approaches to 
implementation problems in a recent overview article in Handbook of Public 
Administration. Qualitative studies are still very important, but right now 
quantitative empirical research is probably more needed. That is the main 
reason why I draw on large-N data in this article.
5 This article is an important 
step in moving from description towards causal inference, taking many of the 
shortcomings in case studies into account. 
To test whether the level of cooperation is related to performance, new 
cross-sectional data covering 2003 was collected.
6 The PES offices are the unit 
of analysis. Questionnaires were distributed to the chief managers of all PES 
offices in February 2004. 268 managers answered the questionnaire, which 
implies a response rate of 75 per cent. Head managers from municipal labour 
market administrations and municipal politicians also answered questionnaires; 
the responses rates were around 85 per cent in both groups.
7 An analysis of the 
non-responses showed no significant difference between respondents and non-
respondents on background characteristics. Register data from the National 
Labour Market Administration supplements the survey. Lastly, official statis-
tics, in the form of municipal characteristics, are taken from the KFAKTA03 
database. Variables are described in Table A1 in Appendix. 
The questionnaire makes it possible to analyse unique data not available 
elsewhere. There are, of course, potential problems with questionnaire data. 
Some managers might provide biased information, either because they would 
like to make their performance look better or because they do not have correct 
information. However, we should not over-estimate these problems: Most of 
the questions are not particularly sensitive and many are easy to answer. It is 
                                                      
5 Brehm & Gates (1997), Gill & Meier (2001), Keiser & Soss (1998), Meier & Keiser (1996) and 
Meier & McFarlane (1996) are examples of studies using large-N US data. 
6 As always in research projects trying to explain phenomena in society, ideally an experimental, 
quasi-experimental or, at least, panel data research set-up should be employed. It is difficult to be 
sure that there is no unobserved heterogeneity – important variables we do not have information 
on – in an analysis only based on cross-sectional data. But research on implementation is far 
from having reached a state where cross-sectional studies are superfluous. 
7 In this article, the answers from municipal managers are used in Table 1. In other sections of 
the article, only data from the questionnaire addressed to the PES offices is utilised.  
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reasonable to assume that the managers do have accurate information – the 
offices are not that large and I encouraged them to check with their personnel if 
they were uncertain about their answers. The incentives to lie in an anonymous 
postal questionnaire that is to be used only for the research purposes are not 
that great either – I made it clear that we were not auditing the agencies con-
cerned. 
The empirical results are presented in the following three sections. First, I 
take a closer look at the authorities’ objectives. Then, the level of cooperation 




5 Diverging  objectives? 
The first question to address is whether the priorities of the PES offices and the 
municipalities are similar or if they diverge. If the objectives and working 
methods were very similar, the relationship between the authorities would not 
be particularly interesting. On the other hand, different priorities make the 
relationship a key question. 
Table 1 shows – by denoting the share of managers claiming that a certain 
goal has a ‘very high’ or ‘fairly high’ priority – how PES offices and municipal 
labour market administrations allocate priorities among different goals. The 
table clearly illustrates that the objectives diverge to a large extent; the percent-
age point differences are large overall. Other ways of merging categories or 
looking at mean values does not change interpretation of the results. 
The PES offices put much more emphasis on formal directives and guide-
lines from the central government and on attaining the quantitative goals of the 
National Labour Market Administration than the municipalities. For instance, 
whereas 98 per cent of the PES managers said that central government rules 
and guidelines have high priority, only 58 per cent of the municipalities’ labour 
market managers gave the same answer. Because subsidises are for the most 
part paid by central government, it is not surprising that shifting persons from 
subsidised to unsubsidised jobs is another objective primarily of concern for 
PES offices (compare 72 per cent with 52 per cent).  
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Table 1. Objectives of PES managers and managers from municipal administrations 
with responsibility for labour market issues (per cent claiming that a certain objective is 






Attaining the quantitative goals of the National 
Labour Market Administration 
97 37  +  60 
Following central government rules and 
guidelines   
98 58  +  40 
Monitoring clients  91  53  + 38 
Improving matching between available jobs and 
unemployed persons 
97 70  +  27 
Shifting people from subsidised to unsubsidised 
jobs 
72 52  +  20 
Ensuring that there are labour market programmes 
for groups of unemployed with severe problems in 
the labour market 
94 80  +  14 
Ensuring that there are labour market programmes 
for young people under 25  
98 92  +  6 
Reducing unemployment  91  89  + 2 
Taking clients’ own requests and needs into 
account 
62 82  -  20 
Improving municipal services for the local 
population 
12 49  -  38 
Activating unemployed persons living on social 
assistance in labour market programmes 
29 79  -  50 
Increasing or maintaining the local population  16  68  - 52 
Reducing expenditure for social assistance    6  83  - 77 
Notes: Data comes from questionnaires distributed to managers of PES offices and municipal labour market 
administrations. Formulation of question: “How are the following objectives prioritised at the PES / in the 
municipality’s labour market activities?” A scale of five categories was used: ‘Very high’, ‘Fairly high’, 
‘Neither high nor low’, ‘Fairly low’, and ‘Very low or not at all’. The number of respondents for each item 
was between 258 and 264 among the PES offices and between 238 and 242 among municipalities. 
 
Municipalities give priority to local objectives. Two examples underscore this. 
Among the PES 16 per cent regarded population goals as important. Almost 70 
per cent of the municipalities answered that they give high priority to local 
population goals. This is to be expected, since a high proportion of municipal 
revenues consists of local income taxes. A decreasing population could be de-
vastating for a municipality’s finances. Moreover, the PES offices do not pay  
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for social assistance. Therefore, decreasing expenditures and activating un-
employed persons living on social assistance are objectives to which they do 
not give priority. Only 6 and 29 per cent, respectively, said that these goals are 
important. This can be compared with 83 per cent of municipal managers who 
claimed that reducing costs for social assistance and 79 per cent who said that 
activating unemployed individuals living on social assistance in programmes 
were important. 
More thorough analyses of preference distances, and causes and the con-
sequences of this are interesting topics that ought to be studied in the future. 
For this article it is, however, sufficient to conclude that there are obvious ten-
sions between the authorities’ objectives. 
 
 
6  Do the authorities cooperate? 
Given that the authorities’ objectives are so dissimilar, the level of cooperation 
becomes an interesting question. Are the authorities at all capable of 
collaboration? To what extent does the level of cooperation vary? Data from 
the questionnaire is used in order to explore three modes of cooperation: com-
munication, contracting and integration. 
The PES office managers were asked how often their agency communicates 
with twelve types of labour market actors, grading the frequency on a five-
category scale from ‘daily contacts’ to ‘never’. The municipalities were one of 
these actors. Table 2 displays the managers’ answers. More than nine out of ten 
agencies communicate with the municipality at least on a weekly basis, and 
approximately every second agency has daily contacts. It is possible to com-
pare the managers’ answers for the twelve types of actors in order to get a 
better estimate of how much communication is going on between the 
authorities. The only actors the PES communicates with to a greater extent than 
the municipalities, on average, are private firms and other PES offices.
8 The 
municipalities are, for example, more often contacted than unions, employers’ 
                                                      
8 The following types of actors were considered (the proportion of offices communicating on a 
‘daily basis’ is reported in parentheses): Private firms (79 %), other PES offices (70 %), the 
municipality (51  %), the Regional Social Insurance office (49  %), the County Labour Board 
(35 %), unions (13 %), other stakeholder organizations (8 %), employers associations (3 %), the 
National Labour Market Board (2 %), the County Council (2 %), other public authorities (1 %), 
the County Administrative Board (0 %).  
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associations and the County Labour Board. This indicates that municipalities 
and PES offices communicate to a considerable extent. 
However, municipalities have many different roles and responsibilities. 
When the managers answered the questionnaire they may have interpreted 
‘municipality’ in different ways. Some perhaps focused on communication 
with the labour market administration, whereas others had a broad definition in 
mind (including several municipal branches). This makes the communication 
measurement somewhat problematic. Thus, another operationalisation is also 
reported in the table. The managers were asked how often the PES contacts 
municipal caseworkers responsible for municipal labour market activities. The 
level of communication is slightly lower if this operationalisation is studied, 
but the conclusion remains unchanged. In the forthcoming analyses, this second 
definition of communication will be utilised since it implies less ambiguity. 
The two communication variables are, however, strongly correlated and the 
conclusions do not depend on how I assess communication.  
Table 2 provides information about the other two modes of cooperation as 
well. PES offices and municipalities can sign cooperation contracts concerning 
youth policy and the Activity Guarantee. If the authorities agree on a contract, 
the municipality gets financial compensation when arranging activities for the 
target groups. Around 77 per cent of the PES offices have a cooperation 
contract related to the youth policy. This figure was about the same in 1999 
(Carling & Larsson 2002). About 80 per cent have a contract concerning the 
Activity Guarantee, which is an increase in comparison with 2001 when, 
according to Forslund et al (2004), approximately 68 per cent of the PES 
offices had a collaboration contract. Contracting seems to be used to a 
relatively high extent today. Nevertheless, about 20 per cent do not have a 
contract, signifying some level of variation. 
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Table 2. The relationship between PES offices and municipalities: communication, con-
tracting and integration 
Variable name  Number of 
observations 
Percentage 
Communication (general level)     
 Daily  137  51 
 Weekly  116  43 
  Monthly or more seldom  15  6 
  N = 268   
Communication (with caseworkers at municipal labour 
market administrations) 
  
 Daily  112  42 
 Weekly  129  49 
  Monthly or more seldom  24  9 
  N = 265   
Contracting    
 Youth  policy  contract  197  77 
  Activity Guarantee contract  193  80 
  N = 256, 242   
Integration    
 0  activities  12  5 
 1  activities  53  23 
 2  activities  109  46 
 3  activities  61  26 
  N = 235   
 
The third mode of cooperation is integration. How should the level of 
integration be measured? In this article, an additive index from zero to three is 
employed. The managers were asked if (a) the PES and the municipality run 
joint programmes, (b) have located personnel from the two organizations in the 
same premises, and (c) have established task groups where caseworkers from 
the two organizations collaborate. What these items have in common is that 
they imply some sort of integration of work. A factor analysis confirms that the 
items form only one dimension and can be used to form an index measuring an 
underlying dimension (see Table A2 in Appendix for details). If none of the 
activities were taking place in 2003, the score on the index will be zero, while 
one activity means a score of one and so on.
 9 
                                                      
9 I do not use the factor scores to calculate the index, since a simple additive index is easier to 
interpret in substantive terms.    
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Some degree of integration is common. Only 5 per cent of the respondents 
had no joint projects, joint localisation or task groups. But the level of 
integration varies: at some locations all three cooperative acts existed in 2003, 
whereas in other places the authorities had not integrated at all. 
In sum, the authorities seem to collaborate to a relatively high degree de-
spite the dissimilarity of preferences, although it is evident that the ties between 




7 Cooperation  and  implementation 
The main question remains to be answered – is there a connection between 
cooperation and implementation? That is what this section is devoted to. 
 
7.1 Operationalisation of implementation 
Three measures of implementation are employed in the article. There are other 
aspects of the performance as well, but the variables included here concern 
vital parts of the policies. The directives to the administration are also relative-
ly clear and, last but not least, quantitative data is available and reliable. These 
three factors make them suitable dependent variables. 
The central government ambition for youth unemployment is clear-cut: if 
individuals under the age of 25 have not found a job after 100 days of un-
employment the PES should activate them by applying labour market pro-
grammes. Using data from the National Labour Market Administration ad-
ministrative system, I have investigated the stock of persons of 20-25 years of 
age, on four occasions
11 in 2003 for each PES office. The number of 
individuals openly unemployed for 110 days or more in sequence, without par-
ticipating in any active measures, directly before the point of measurement, has 
been counted. By setting the point of calculation to 110 days instead of 100, I 
make sure that the results are not affected by a possible delay in registration. 
Because the agencies are of different sizes, one cannot focus on the absolute 
number of persons, although the government’s ambition is that the number 
                                                      
10 Communication, contracting and integration are positively correlated. That is, a high value for 
one of the variables is associated with a high value for the others. 
11 The 15
th of February, May, August and November.  
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should equal zero.
12 Hence, I have divided the number of young clients with at 
least 110 days of open unemployment in a row by the number of young clients 
registered at the PES for the same number of days. This is done for the four 
occasions mentioned above, and the average is used as a dependent variable. 
This normalisation is the most reasonable one. The variable is called Youth 
Policy and a value near zero implies a better implementation. 
Two variables address the level of implementation of the Activity 
Guarantee. Unemployed persons are supposed to be enrolled in the Activity 
Guarantee after 27 months of unbroken registration. I calculate how large a 
proportion of the individuals with 835 days (27,5 months) of PES registration 
was activated in the programme on the same four occasions as when the 
variable Youth Policy was calculated.
13 The average value indicates how well 
the agency manages to enrol clients; this variable is named AG Coverage. The 
reason not to use precisely 27 months is, again, to avoid problems that a delay 
in registration might entail. This time, a higher score (maximum 1.00) implies a 
better implementation. Once again, the data comes from the National Labour 
Market Administration. 
The Activity Guarantee is supposed to consist of intense counselling and the 
activities should be full time for all participants. In the questionnaire, the 
managers were asked if the PES arranges full-time activities for all (or almost 
all) of the participants in the Activity Guarantee. The information from the 
questionnaire is used as the second measurement of the implementation of the 
programme. This variable can have two values (0 = no, 1 = yes) and a higher 
value (i e organizing full-time activities) implies a better implementation. The 
variable is referred to as AG Activity.
14 
These three variables do not measure the content of the activities. Ideally, I 
would like to have variables that capture quality as well. However, it is not 
clear what ‘good quality’ implies, which makes measures of quality 
problematic, given a top-down perspective of implementation. Moreover, I do 
                                                      
12 For instance, a large PES office (e g 150 young people registered) has obviously performed 
better than a small PES office (e g 10 young people registered) if both have five clients with no 
activation. 
13 I have complied with the Swedish National Labour Market Administration’s (2004) definition 
of the way in which the registration period should be computed. 
14 This variable probably has the highest risk of measurement errors in this study. Hence, it is 
important not to draw far-reaching conclusions based solely on AG Activity. Taken together with 
the other dependent variables this aspect is, however, very  valuable.  
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not have access to the relevant data. Thus, I have to restrict the study to the as-
pects of implementation mentioned above. 
 
Table 3. Implementation of the youth policy and the Activity Guarantee 
Descriptive Statistics  Variable name 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max  N 
Youth  Policy  0.34 0.14 0.05 0.90 256 
AG  Coverage  0.49 0.16 0.00 0.97 241 
AG  Activity  0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 243 
 
Table 3 describes how the offices have succeeded in implementing the youth 
policy and the Activity Guarantee. It is evident that neither the youth policy nor 
the Activity Guarantee has been fully implemented. The agencies’ mean share 
of young clients openly unemployed 110 days in a row or more, of those young 
people registered with the PES, is about 34 per cent. This figure is not 
especially close to the (perhaps unrealistic) ambition stipulated by central 
government (a value of zero). None of the agencies have managed to comp-
letely avoid having young people with 110 or more days of open unemploy-
ment registered. 
Approximately half the clients registered for at least 835 days are, on 
average, enrolled in the Activity Guarantee. There are offices that have 
engaged almost all these clients in the programme, whereas, in other cases, 
none of them are taking part in the Guarantee programme. Table 3 also reveals 
that seven out ten offices organize full-time activities for participants in the 
Activity Guarantee. Thus, there is also an obvious variation in the PES offices’ 
implementation of the Activity Guarantee. 
Before examine the link between cooperation and implementation, it is im-
portant to discuss what other variables need to be considered. 
 
7.2 Control  variables 
Unfortunately, the implementation research discourse has not been able to 
develop a generally accepted theory that pinpoints the precise variables to in-
clude when explaining implementation. As O’Toole (2004, 310) puts it, 
“[t]heories about policy implementation have been almost embarrassingly 
plentiful, yet theoretical consensus is not on the horizon… After hundreds of 
empirical studies, validated findings are relatively scarce”. However, there are  
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some broad categories of factors which merit attention. External and internal 
characteristics of an agency carrying out public policies may influence imp-
lementation (Gill & Meier 2001; Keiser & Soss 1998; Winter 2003a). Below, 
the control variables used in this study are briefly discussed. Details, including 
descriptive statistics, are reported in the Appendix. 
External  characteristics that should be taken into account are the client 
group  treated and the implementation environment (Winter 2003a). A de-
manding clientele and a difficult labour market situation might affect imp-
lementation positively or negatively. On the one hand, the task becomes more 
challenging, which may make implementation more difficult. On the other 
hand, the incentives to arrange appropriate programmes are probably stronger, 
since it is less likely that clients can manage on their own. There should also be 
a greater demand for services when the labour market situation is problematical 
(cf Meier & Keiser 1996). 
Three variables that describe clients’ characteristics are used as control 
variables. Some offices are responsible for vocational rehabilitation of un-
employed individuals. These agencies’ clientele is quite different from the 
client group of the standard PES, and therefore a dummy variable for re-
habilitation PES offices is incorporated in the analyses. The other two controls 
are the proportion of long-term unemployed clients and the proportion of 
clients who are not Nordic citizens. By including these variables, I am able to 
hold important clientele characteristics constant. 
What characterises the PES offices’ local context is measured by the 
following variables. The municipal unemployment rate, including participants 
in active labour market measures, provides an assessment of the local labour 
market situation. The size of the local population is added as a control variable 
in order to address other socio-economic factors (the local labour market is 
very different in a large, urban area in comparison with a thinly populated 
municipality with a small population). A dummy variable indicating the pre-
sence of a Social Democratic government or a non-socialist government cap-
tures the local political context. This political variable’s importance for imp-
lementation has been stressed in earlier studies (Keiser & Soss 1998). 
Performance could also vary due to factors internal to an agency. Keeping 
external circumstances constant, agencies which have employees who are more 
willing to carry out a policy and who have a high capacity to implement 
decisions will, on average, perform better (Sannerstedt 2001).  
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There is solid evidence that the incentives, preferences and attitudes of 
bureaucrats – i e the willingness – often affect performance (Brehm & Gates 
1997). Implementation is likely to be improved if an agency gives a policy high 
priority. The questionnaire supplies data on the PES offices’ willingness to 
implement. Among several labour market objectives, the PES managers rated 
the importance of arranging programmes for unemployed young people and for 
unemployed individuals with severe problems on the labour market (see 
Section 5). From this rating I have constructed a ranking of the objectives (1-
13) for each PES office. A value of one implies that no other objective is given 
more priority, whereas a value of 13 implies that all other objectives are ranked 
higher. 
It is difficult to get good indicators of an agency’s capacity and the intensive 
case-study probably has an advantage over the quantitative approach here. 
However, staff and financial resources are the main factors influencing 
capacity. If the agencies do not have these resources they will certainly run into 
difficulties when policies are implemented (Gill & Meier 2001; Sannerstedt 
2001). The National Labour Market Board allocates resources so that each 
agency receives an amount reflecting the local labour market situation and the 
client group (Nyberg & Skedinger 1998). Thus, if resources are allocated 
adequately, capacity should not vary due to staff and financial resources. 
Nevertheless, in the event that resources are distributed poorly, the number of 
clients per employee and the amount of financial resources per client reserved 
for benefits for participants in programmes are used as control variables. 
Several organizational factors could shape the agency’s capacity (Winter 
2003a). Identifying the important organizational characteristics is difficult, and 
the capacity may impinge on various variables we cannot observe. In this 
article, organizational size is employed as a control variable. This is primarily 
motivated by the fact that large agencies have greater opportunities to co-
operate with other organizations
15, but also because size could be correlated 
with many organizational aspects that may affect implementation. The 
logarithm of the number of employees at the PES is utilised as a measure of 
organizational size. I use the logarithm, since it is reasonable to assume that a 
one unit change in the number of employees is more important when staff size 
is small than when it is large. 
                                                      
15 For instance, a large staff increases the chance that an agency communicates with the 
municipality on a daily basis.   
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7.3  Is there a link between cooperation and 
implementation? 
In the following analysis, I investigate whether the degree of cooperation can 
account for the differences in implementation performance depicted in 
Section 7.1. The empirical results are reported in Table 4.
 16 The upper part of 
the table presents the effects of communication, contract and integration, while 
control variables are reported in the lower section.
17 When discussing the 
results, I focus on the relationship between cooperation and implementation. 
Control variables are only commented upon briefly. 
Linear regression models are estimated when Youth Policy and AG 
Coverage are used as dependent variables (the first two columns in Table 4). 
The level of activation within the Activity Guarantee is a dichotomous variable 
(AG Activity). Thus, the estimation method in the last column is binary logit. 
The logit model yields information about whether the relationship is positive or 
negative and if it is statistically significant, but the coefficients are not readily 
interpretable. Therefore, predicted probabilities, based on logit coefficients, are 
reported in Figure 1. Remember that communication is measured by dummy 
variables – ‘daily’ communication is the reference to ‘weekly’ and ‘monthly or 
less’ communication. 
                                                      
16 The number of observations is slightly below 200 in all three models in Table 4. The total 
number of respondents in the questionnaire was 268 (see Section 4), but because some agencies 
do not work with the two policies, and since there are internal missing values for some variables, 
the number of valid cases is reduced. 
17 Regression diagnostics have been conducted (e  g examination of outliers and tests of 
multicollieanrity and heteroscedasticity) and several model specifications have been tested to 
cope with problems that appear. The general impression in Table 4 remains unchanged. There 
might be some problem of endogeniety regarding two control variables: the share of long-term 
unemployed clients and the unemployment rate. I have estimated models excluding these 
variables. Minor differences appear, but conclusions are not altered.  
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Table 4. Effects on the implementation of the youth policy and the Activity Guarantee 
(standard errors in parentheses)  
  Youth Policy  AG Coverage  AG Activity 












Youth contract   0.009 
(0.019) 
--- --- 














































Priority of youth clients   0.004 
(0.006) 
 ---   --- 








































Notes: * indicates significance at the 0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level, and *** at the .01 level (two-tailed 
tests). Pseudo R² is McFaddens R² (see Long, 1997). The number of observations is 199, 194 and 189 in the 
three models respectively. The reference category to the dummy variables ‘weekly’ and ‘monthly or less’ 
communication is ‘daily’ communication.  The first column reports results from a linear regression model 
with robust standard errors, due to heteroscedasticity (see Fox, 1991). The model in the second column is 
estimated by ordinary least squares, whereas the model in the third column is estimated by binary logit. The 
Log-likelihood in the third model is –87.6115. Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics are reported 
in Table A1 in Appendix.  
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Panel A. Predicted probabilities of organizing full-time activities for offices with and without a 






































Panel B. Predicted probabilities of organizing full-time activities for offices communicating with 

































0 1 2 3
Integration
Daily contacts Weekly contacts
monthly contacts
 
Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of organizing full-time activities within the Activity 
Guarantee (continuous control variables held at mean values and discrete control 
variables held at mode values)  
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The first column in Table 4 concerns the implementation of the youth policy. 
Here, a negative coefficient implies a better performance. The general imp-
ression is that implementation and collaboration are not strongly related. All 
coefficients except one are statistically insignificant and substantially small.
18 
Moreover, they are not robust to model specification.
19 Instead, traditional fac-
tors highlighted in the implementation literature – such as the client/staff ratio, 
client group characteristics and environmental conditions – appear to account 
for the variation in implementation. However, the proportion of youth without 
activation after 110 days of unemployment is, on average, 9.8 percentage 
points lower for agencies communicating with the municipality on a monthly 
basis (or more seldom) than agencies contacting municipalities on a daily basis, 
all else equal. The effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, com-
municating to a low extent seems to improve the implementation of the youth 
policy. However, the effect is somewhat dependent on model specification. 
Making far-reaching conclusions about the impact of communication on the 
implementation of the youth policy is therefore hazardous. 
The results concerning the Activity Guarantee are reported in the last two 
columns in Table 4. Positive coefficients imply improved implementation. 
There is one particularly clear result – PES offices that have a collaborative 
contract manage to carry out the programmes’ intentions to a greater extent 
than offices without such a contract. When controlling for internal and external 
characteristics, a contract has a positive and significant effect, both on enrolling 
clients and arranging full-time activities for participants. The coefficients are 
substantially large and are not sensitive to model specification. 
Having a contract increases the predicted share of clients in the programme 
by 9.5 percentage points (among those with 835 days or more of registration). 
Knowing that PES offices, on average, engage 49 per cent of these individuals 
in the guarantee (see Table 3 in Section 7.1), an increase of 9.5 percentage 
points is a relatively sizeable effect. 
                                                      
18 To exemplify that the coefficients are small, we can look at the integration coefficient. If the 
integration index (0-3) increases by one activity, the predicted proportion of young people 
unemployed for 110 days or more in a row not enrolled in a programme decreases only by 1.1 
percentage points, all else equal. And since the effect is statistically insignificant it might just as 
well be zero. 
19 The direction of the coefficient changes, depending on exactly what control variables are 
added, and if influential outliers are excluded.  
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The logit coefficient (1.695) in the last column of Table 4 tells us that there 
is a positive and significant relationship between having a contract and 
organizing full-time activities. To get a better understanding of the size of this 
effect we must turn to Panel A in Figure 1. This figure displays the probability 
of arranging full-time activities for offices with and without a cooperation con-
tract, as the level of integration changes. The predicted probability of organiz-
ing full-time activities for agencies that have a contract is around 0.80-0.90. 
The probability is clearly below 0.70 at all levels of integration for offices 
without a contract, and when the score on the integration variable is at its 
maximum, the predicted probability is below 0.40. 
What impact does integration and communication have on the imp-
lementation of the Activity Guarantee? Integration and communication do not 
affect the performance – the coefficients are statistically insignificant, holding 
everything else constant.
20 
A note on control variables is appropriate. Whereas a high priority of the 
client group seems to be important for organizing full-time activities, access to 
considerable financial resources, low client/staff ratio and a small organization 
imply that more clients can be enrolled in the Activity Guarantee. Thus, 
internal characteristics of the PES are important. The implementation literature 
is not clear on whether a demanding context and client group will be negatively 
or positively linked to implementation performance – there are reasonable 
motives for both views (see Section 7.2). This is also demonstrated in Table 4, 
where the unemployment rate, for example, affects the three aspects of imp-
lementation in various ways. It is also interesting to note that the type of local 
government (socialist or non-socialist) does not directly affect implementation. 
A couple of important questions arise from the results in Table 4 and 
Figure 1. Firstly, why is there a difference between the effects of cooperation 
on implementation for the youth policy and the Activity Guarantee? There are 
large differences between the two policies. The clients in the Activity 
Guarantee are probably more demanding than unemployed young people, since 
they have, on average, been unemployed for a much longer period. They are 
                                                      
20 Note that the sign of the coefficients indicate that a lot of communication has a positive impact 
on implementation and that integration and implementation are negatively related. In a couple of 
model specifications (not as restrict) some of these effects are, indeed, significant at the 0.05 
level. Nevertheless, since the coefficients are not statistically significant in the main model, and 
since they are not robust to model specification, I conclude that communication and integration 
are of minor importance.  
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probably less motivated to engage in labour market activities and look for jobs. 
The Activity Guarantee is very intense and resource-demanding and therefore 
implies an appreciable workload for the PES offices (Forslund et al 2004). One 
explanation of the differing results could be that the assignment to 
accomplished in the Activity Guarantee is much more challenging. The PES 
offices need external assistance from the municipalities only under these 
conditions, otherwise they manage quite well on their own. 
Secondly, why is the only clear positive association found in the analysis 
the effect of having a cooperation contract (on the implementation of the 
Activity Guarantee)? The explanation is probably that the contract is designed 
especially for a specific task, i  e arranging activities under the Activity 
Guarantee. Communication and integration, on the other hand, involve co-
operation at a general level. Hence, the results suggest that if collaboration is to 
improve implementation the cooperative activities should be organized for a 
specific purpose. 
 
7.4  A test of the time order between cooperation and 
implementation 
It is not implausible that the level of implementation affects the level of co-
operation rather than the other way around, which I have assumed in 
Section 7.3. For example, if a PES office arranges full-time activities for clients 
in the Activity Guarantee, the need for external assistance may increase and/or 
municipalities may be more interested in collaborating with the PES. In turn, 
this will lead to more collaboration between the authorities. This is certainly a 
possibility, although the assumed time order is probably more likely. That is, it 
is likely that a considerable degree of cooperation increases the agency’s 
capacity, which then affects implementation. However, this problem should not 
be ignored. 
One way to test causal order is to check the timing. Cross-sectional data is 
limited in providing evidence of time precedence, whereas panel data has ad-
vantages (Finkel 1995). Some panel data is available for a smaller number of 
cases (137 agencies). I have information about whether the PES arranged full-
time activities for the clients in the Activity Guarantee in 2001 and 2003. I also  
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know if a collaboration contract existed in 2001 and 2003.
21 This data can be 
utilised to estimate a two-wave cross-lagged effect model, which is a test of the 
time order between variables. The basic idea is to predict each variable (AG 
Activity and AG Contract) in 2003 by its previous value in 2001 (the lagged 
dependent variable), as well as the value of the other variable in 2001.
22 
Figure 2. A cross-lagged effect model of the relationship between cooperation and 
implementation 
 
The cross-lagged model cannot be regarded as a definite solution to the time 
order problem. Data exists only for a sub sample of agencies, with variables on 
one mode of cooperation (contracting) and one measure of implementation 
(full-time activities under the Activity Guarantee). I also have to assume that 
the causal lags are about two years. That is, signing a contract in 2001 affects 
implementation in 2003 (approximately). It is reasonable to assume that there is 
some time lag, although two years is rather on the high side. Nevertheless, the 
model provides information about which time order is most plausible. The 
sample size is acceptably large, and it is reasonable to assume that the time 
order between other sorts of cooperation and implementation is the same as that 
detected in this case. 
                                                      
21 Data for 2001 comes from a research project at the Institute for Labour Market Policy 
Evaluation (IFAU); see e g Forslund et al (2004). The availability of panel data for contracting is 
valuable, since the clearest and most interesting relationship detected in the analysis in Section 
7.3 concerns this aspect of cooperation. 
22 The cross-lagged model is compatible with the “Granger test” for causality employed in time 





AG Activity 2001 
AG Contract 2001  AG Contract 2003 
AG Activity 2003 
Notes: Entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (* indicates significance at the 
0.10 level, ** at the 0.05 level and *** at the 0.01 level, N = 137).  
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Logit coefficients from the cross-lagged model are reported in Figure 2.
23 
As expected, the lagged dependent variables have positive and significant 
effects. The diagonal arrows in Figure 2 are, however, of greater interest. 
Having a collaborative contract in 2001 significantly increases the propensity 
to organize full-time Activity Guarantee activities in 2003. The effect of 
arranging full-time activities in 2001 on the propensity to have a contract in 
2003 is, on the other hand, not significant, even though it is positive.
24 This 
speaks clearly in favour of the time order assumed in the analysis in 
Section 7.3. That is, cooperation precedes implementation. 
 
 
8 Concluding  remarks 
Contacts between central and local government authorities are inescapable in 
contemporary democratic states. Their relationships may be of major im-
portance for the realisation of political ideas. This article has analysed col-
laborative efforts of Public Employment Service (PES) offices and 
municipalities in active labour market policy in Sweden. 
There are three key findings. Firstly, I detect a considerable discrepancy 
between PES offices’ and municipalities’ priorities, although both authorities 
share the overall goal of reducing unemployment. The municipalities’ 
objectives are more locally oriented (financial issues are often important). For 
instance, beneficial local population development and reduced expenditure for 
welfare benefits are essential goals in municipal labour market activities. In 
contrast, PES offices are more inclined to obey signals from the central govern-
ment. 
This implies that increased municipal involvement is likely to change the 
content of labour market policy in favour of local interests. This would be a 
step away from the traditional labour market policy model, which emphasises, 
                                                      
23 I have also estimated the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) without any substantial 
change in results. 
24 As mentioned in Section 7.3, logit coefficients must be transformed before substantial 
interpretation is possible. Having a cooperation contract in 2001 increases the probability of 
arranging full-time activities in 2003 by 24 percentage points, given that full-time activities were 
not arranged in 2001. Similarly, the propensity to have a contract in 2003 increases by 15 
percentage points if the office arranged full-time activities in 2001 (the effect is not significant at 
the 0.10 level), assuming that the PES did not have a collaboration contract in 2001.  
IFAU – Does cooperation improve implementation?  31 
for example, control by central government, geographical mobility and a 
uniform treatment of similar cases. One would expect more local elements in 
active measures in several countries, since local governments have been given 
a profound role in this policy area in many states. 
Secondly, despite the dissimilarity in preferences the authorities cooperate 
to a relatively high extent. The central government encourages cooperation 
between PES offices and municipalities. Thus, the local activities reflect central 
government ambitions in this respect. 
Thirdly, cooperation is only associated with a better implementation per-
formance under certain conditions. I have investigated measures directed to-
wards young people and persons who have been unemployed for a very long 
time. One feature which these policies share is that the central government en-
courages cooperation at the local level. But there are clear differences as well. 
One would assume that young clients call for less resources, for example. I do 
not find any noticeable impact of cooperation on the implementation of the 
youth policy. PES offices collaborating with municipalities to a limited extent 
perform just as well as agencies that cooperate to a considerable extent. The 
analysis of long-term unemployed individuals concentrates on a programme 
called the Activity Guarantee. Here, a clear positive association between 
signing a collaborative contract and implementation performance is detected, 
but other types of cooperation seem to be of minor importance. Thus, the re-
sults suggest that a positive relationship between cooperation and imp-
lementation can only be anticipated when collaborative efforts between central 
and local government authorities are designed to carry out a specific and de-
manding task. By all means, we cannot justify all sorts of cooperation by using 
the argument that this will promote implementation. 
However, two points should be borne in mind. Cooperation can be worth-
while for other reasons than implementation, implying that as long as we do not 
find any significant negative effect we should encourage collaborative 
endeavours. On the other hand, there could also be negative effects on overall 
outcome measurements that are not detected in my analysis. The other thing we 
must remember is that more empirical research is required before it is possible 
to make clear causal statements about the relationship between cooperation and 
performance. Quantitative methods are rare in the implementation literature, 
especially in European research. Thus, I have followed Goggin’s (1986) and 
Winter’s (2003b) advice and used quantitative data and statistical research 
techniques. This allows for better tests of the link between cooperation and  
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implementation. Elaborated quantitative studies which make it possible to be 
more certain about causal relationships would make an important contribution 
to this research field in the future. 
A key question which should be raised is whether the findings in this study 
can be generalised to other situations. Apparently, this is a very difficult 
question. Swedish labour market policy is characterised by clear links between 
central and local government responsibilities. There is also a great deal of 
external pressure for collaboration, for example central government ex-
hortations. Probably, this means that labour market policy is an area in which 
we have good reasons for believing that cooperation is valuable. This case may 
therefore be seen as a ‘critical case’, meaning that here, if anywhere, we ought 
to expect that cooperation will improve implementation. Given that the study 
only indicates a positive relationship under certain circumstances, we should 
probably not anticipate general positive effects in policy areas in which links 
between central and local government authorities are not as evident.
25 
Finally, the idea of solving public problems by means of partnerships of 
actors is popular both in ‘real life politics’ and among academic scholars. For 
example, several researchers taking the ‘governance’ discourse as a point of 
departure praise the partnership model (see Pierre 2000 for an overview of 
governance literature). This model, based on the idea that several local actors 
should collaborate in order to improve the delivery of public policy, has had a 
pervasive breakthrough in recent years (Ehn  2001). The virtues and short-
comings of this model could certainly be discussed at length. But this is not the 
place to do this, although the empirical findings here might still contribute to 
the debate. Since the study shows that cooperation is only associated with 
better implementation under very special circumstances, we should not be too 
eager to praise the partnership model. Instead, it is more important to develop 
and test theories about when cooperation enhances implementation, rather than 
stipulating that collaboration is a ‘good thing’ in general. 
                                                      
25 However, the empirical evidence in the study shows large differences between the authorities’ 
objectives. It is almost certainly easier to find a positive relationship between cooperation and 
implementation in a policy area in which the authorities’ priorities are similar. This means that it 
is difficult to generalise the results for a situation in which there are clear links between the 
agencies’ responsibilities and the priorities are in agreement. On the other hand, conflicting 
interests are probably very common.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Description of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables 
  AG Activity (questionnaire data) 
    A PES office arranging full-time activities for all (or almost all) clients participating in 
the Activity Guarantee (dummy variable) 
1 = full-time activity (0.71), 0 = otherwise (0.29) 
  AG Coverage (register data, AMV) 
    Proportion of persons registered for a sequence of 835 days or more at the PES office 
who are enrolled in the Activity Guarantee; average of four different points of measure-
ment (15
th of February, May, August and December 2003) 
mean: 0.49 min: 0.00 max: 0.97 sd: 0.16 
  Youth Policy (register data, AMV) 
    Young person aged 20 to 25 with at least 110 days of open unemployment in sequence, 
divided by the total number of young people registered at the PES for at least 110 days; 
average of four different points of measurement (15
th of February, May, August and 
December 2003) 
mean: 0.34 min: 0.05 max: 0.90 sd: 0.14 
Main independent variables 
 Communication  (questionnaire  data) 
    Contact frequency between the PES office and the municipality’s caseworkers 
responsible for municipal labour market activities (dummy variables) 
daily (0.42, reference), weekly (0.49), monthly or more seldom (0.09) 
  Youth contract (questionnaire data) 
    The PES office and the municipality have signed a cooperation contract about youth pro-
grammes (dummy variable) 
1 = youth contract (0.77), 0 = no contract (0.23) 
  AG contract (questionnaire data) 
    The PES office and the municipality have signed a cooperation contract about pro-
grammes in the Activity Guarantee (dummy variable) 
1 = AG contract (0.80), 0 = no contract (0.20) 
  Integration (questionnaire data) 
    Index (0-3) measuring the number of integrative acts (joint localisation, joint projects 
and cooperative task groups) between the PES office and the municipality 
mean: 1.93 min: 0.00 max: 3.00 sd: 0.83 
Control variables 
 Long-term  unemployed  clients (register data, AMV) 
    Share of clients at the PES office unemployed  for six months or more in 2003 
mean: 0.11 min: 0.00 max: 0.30 sd: 0.05  
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Table A1. Continued 
 Non-Nordic  clients  (register data, AMV) 
    Proportion of clients at the PES office without Nordic citizenship in 2003 
mean: 0.07 min: 0.01  max: 0.62 sd: 0.07 
  Rehabilitation office (information from the Internet homepage of AMV, www.ams.se) 
    PES office responsible for vocational rehabilitation (dummy variable) 
1 = rehabilitation PES (0.04), 0 = otherwise (0.96) 
  Unemployment (official municipal statistics from KFAKTA03) 
    Local unemployment rate, including participants in measures, in the municipality where 
the PES office is located (April 2003) 
mean: 5.47 min: 1.90 max: 19.60 sd: 2.31 
  Local population (official municipal statistics from KFAKTA03) 
    Number of inhabitants in the municipality (in 1,000’s of persons) where the PES office is 
located (December 2002) 
mean: 95.56 min: 2.61 max: 758.15 sd: 192.14 
  Socialist government (official municipal statistics from KFAKTA03) 
    The chairman of the municipal executive board represents the Social Democrats (dummy 
variable) 
1 = socialist government (0.67), 0 = otherwise (0.33) 
  Priority of young clients (questionnaire data) 
    The PES manager’s rank of the objective ‘ensuring that there are labour market pro-
grammes for young people under 25’ among 13 objectives (scale 1-13, where 1 means 
most and 13 least priority; objectives may be ranked equally important) 
mean: 1.78 min: 1.00 max: 10,00 sd: 1,86 
  Priority of difficult clients (questionnaire data) 
    The PES manager’s rank of the objective ‘ensuring that there are labour market pro-
grammes for groups of unemployed with severe problems in the labour market’ among 
13 objectives (scale 1-13, where 1 means most and 13 least priority; objectives may be 
ranked equally important) 
mean: 2.78 min: 1.00 max: 12.00 sd: 2.46 
  Clients per staff member (register data, AMV) 
    The average number of clients (measured in 10 clients) per week per employee at the 
PES office 
mean: 4.96  min: 0.26 max: 12.44 sd: 1.74 
  Financial resources (questionnaire data) 
    The amount of financial resources at the PES office reserved for benefits to clients 
participating in active measures (in 1,000 Swedish crowns) per week divided by the 
number of clients per week 
mean: 0.66 min: 0.00 max: 3.01 sd: 0.35 
  Organizational size (register data, AMV) 
    The logarithm of the number of employees at the PES office 
Mean: 2.63 min: 0.00 max: 4.65 sd: 0.78 
Notes: AMV is the Swedish abbreviation for the Swedish National Labour Market Administration. 
KFAKTA03 is a Swedish database with several municipal variables gathered from different data sources.  
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Table A2. Principal component factor analysis 
Cooperative behaviour  Factor loadings on the 
first dimension (‘integration’) 
The PES and the municipality have located staff in the same 
premises 
0.68 
The PES and the municipality arrange joint labour market 
projects 
0.72 
The PES and the municipality have collaborative groups in 
which caseworkers from the two offices participate 
0.54 
Notes: Entries are factor loadings in a principal component analysis (n = 235). The retention of factors is 
based on the Kaiser criterion (i e eigenvalues greater than 1.0). The eigenvalue for the integration dimension 
is 1.27. The factor explains 42.3 per cent of the variance in the variables. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity in-
dicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix at the .05 level. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) is .54 (below .50 is usually considered 
unacceptable). 
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